This post looks at the House of Commons discussion about the Health and Social Care Bill on 6th September. As usual, a lot of what was going on was detailed technical stuff, but the first day of it was mainly about privatisation and competition, including the removal of the ‘private patient cap’ (the limit on the proportion of income-earning private patients a Foundation Trust could have). This is relevant for social workers because if the critics are right, poorer people who only have access to the NHS rather than the cash to buy what they need, or a job that gives them health insurance, are likely to find it slower and longer to get their healthcare than they have become used to in the last few years because priority will be given to privatecare and money-earning
It is relevant for palliative care and social work for the main reason that the debate was not about what is most important. Most important are the increasing number of older people who are getting more frail and approaching the end of life, and have other long-term conditions. All this debate was mainly about political views about whether increased competition and increased private providers will be good for more effective care. No doubt there will be more private providers and and more competition if the Bill in its present form passes, because everything about the government’s and the Secretary of State’s attitude suggests that this is important to them and it will therefore happen by hook or crook. This is what happens in our poitical system: the people in power get their way by swinging the system slightly in favour of the things they want; not that increasing the private contribution was much less important to Labour’s health tsars during the period of the last government.
It does not seem that there will be much protection for the increasing population of older frailer people and others who will need longer term care. The debate did not address that directly. Therefore we can expect their position to worsen; care for them will slow up and go missing. Any amount of coordinating less money will not solve that. The likelihood is, however, that what one minister said will also be true: most long-term health providers will not be doing a lot of private patient stuff so nothing much will change for most people with long-term care needs. They will be getting the best they can out of a slowly-deteriorating system that does not take much priority political notice of their needs, while the whizzies with their acute care will be making money from the people who can and who want to pay, for the people who want to get more money for being involved in healthcare.
Some of the debate was about balancing competitiveness with collaboration; critics think the government has still not ensured that collaboration is more important than competitive markets. And that’s really important for palliative care patients and social work service users who also need a good NHS service
Most of the huffing and puffing frankly sounded like old-style political skirmishing over very little, rather than transformational change for the people palliative care and social work deal with: see what you think [my comments in square brackets].
The first group of amendments were about the vexed question of whether, to what extent and in what ways the government’s aim was to privatise the NHS. You can see this debate at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110906/debtext/110906-0001.htm#11090649000003
It was tetchy. The Secretary of State discussed five main changes about this. The first issue was what would happen if a service (such as a foundation hospital) went bust.
First, the Bill puts clinically led commissioning at the heart of securing high-quality services for local populations. It is therefore right that commissioners should have a leading role when continuing access to services is threatened. Our amendments therefore strengthen the role of commissioners. For the first time, commissioners will have an explicit role in working with Monitor to agree plans to secure continuity of services. [Continuity of services means carrying on with providing somehting if the healthcare provider - eg the local hospital - collapses in debt or for some other reason.]
Secondly, commissioners will need to be supported in acting with providers to ensure that they have access to the scope, quality and choice of services they need. It is about promoting high-quality, effective and integrated services, as set out in clause 58. This will be the task of Monitor. If need be, when continued access to services is threatened because of failure occurring in a particular provider, Monitor will have a range of actions it can take. For example, it could take action to secure sustainability of essential services by adjusting prices. This would be necessary where a provider is otherwise unable to cover the costs of essential services—for example, because of lower patient volumes in more remote areas of the country.
Thirdly, if a provider gets into significant difficulties, we have provided Monitor with powers to be able to try to turn around the provider. The aim would always be to support the recovery of the provider, wherever this was possible. Specifically, the amendments require Monitor to maintain an ongoing assessment of risk to the continued supply of NHS services. Monitor must then intervene proactively to help a provider to address problems and, where necessary, agree contingency plans with commissioners.
Fourthly, we have put in place provisions to deal with the rare event of a provider no longer being sustainable in its current form. In that instance, the priority must be to secure continued access to the services patients need. [But not, you notice, continuation of the present provider, so if my local Hospital goes under they can call someone else in; possibly one of their private friends] This protection is particularly important in relation to foundation trusts, which of course are the principal providers of acute, emergency and specialist hospital services.
Fifthly, it is essential that political accountability runs through what hon. Members will all know is central to our responsibilities to our constituents. Our plans therefore strengthen political accountability at both the local and national level. At a local level, the amendments enhance democratic legitimacy by extending local authority scrutiny to all NHS services [this could in the end, if the local councillors and their, mainly social care, advisers do a good job of demanding a health service that is locally responsive and integrates with social care - they could push NHS people to respond to local social care need better, rathre than accepting this constant winge that social care does not help meet NHS objectives]. That is in contrast to previous proposals, where only designated services would have been subject to such scrutiny. At a national level, we will establish a process for the Secretary of State to veto proposals, in individual cases relating to unsustainable foundation trusts, if he decides that they do not secure continued access to NHS services and, as a last resort, to intervene where he believes that the NHS commissioning board or Monitor has failed to discharge its functions.
This is the comment from Frank Dobson, the former Labour Health Secretary:
To ask the essentially collaborative health care system in this country to turn over to being competitive is a bit like asking the Meat and Livestock Commission to promote vegetarianism: it is simply not what people want to do; it is not their approach and nor should it be. It remains the case that Monitor is still rigged in favour of promoting competition. Let me point out…that clause 58(3) states:
“Monitor must exercise its functions with a view to preventing anti-competitive behaviour in the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS which is against the interests of people who use such services.”
However, it does not say that “Monitor must exercise its functions with a view to preventing competitive behaviour in the provision of health care services which may be against the interests of the people who use such services”. Apparently, then, there is a basic, intrinsic and fundamental assumption that competition must be beneficial and non-competition must be harmful. If the Government say that Monitor is neutral, it should be given a neutrality in respect of competition and non-competition. …the unfair competition of some of the independent treatment centres was harmful to and threatened the services provided by neighbouring NHS hospitals. There is clear evidence here of problems within the private sector.
I recall that, a few years ago, United Health—a subsidiary of the US United Health—took over three GP services in my constituency. It bid that it could provide the range of services for less than the local GPs, so it got the contracts. It has not complied with all the conditions that were set, but in the end, the primary care trust decided that it could not take it to court because it would be such a lengthy and expensive exercise and it feared that the PCT might not win. Not content with that, United Health recently announced that it was selling the franchise to another private outfit. It did not consult the staff. It did not consult any elected local representatives—neither myself nor councillors. Above all, it never consulted the patients. These private sector outfits regard patients as part of the chattels that they can dispose of to maximum benefit and maximum profit.
That illustrates the fact that if we are to have contract-based provision of services, a huge amount of lawyer effort will be put into trying to draw up watertight contracts. What one lawyer thinks is a watertight contract, another lawyer will make a leaky contract by puncturing a hole in it, and we will go over to the system in the United States, where zillions of dollars are spent on court challenges or settlements with the providers of health care.
Furthermore, there is virtually no major American supplier of health care that has not been indicted for defrauding federal taxpayers, city taxpayers, state taxpayers, doctors or patients—and sometimes all five. I thus asked the Secretary of State whether he would rule out giving any NHS contracts to any organisation that had been indicted for defrauding people in another country. He gave me about a page-long answer, which could be summarised as, “No, he would not rule them out.”
We are thus talking about the possibility of European competition law being used to force our Secretary of State to allow people to give contracts to American companies whose greatest claim to fame is that they have defrauded innumerable Americans. I think that that is intolerable. I would have thought that all these anti-EU Conservatives would have found it rather embarrassing to think that European law was going to be used to allow fraudulent Americans to get contracts working in our national health service. All those things, however, will be possible under the system proposed by the Secretary of State.
Liz Kendall (Labour) made some related points:
The Bill establishes Monitor as an economic regulator, modelled on the same lines as those for gas, electricity and railways. The explanatory notes make this explicit. Page 85 states that clauses in part 3 are based
“upon precedents from the utilities, rail and telecoms industries”.
Indeed, in an interview with The Times earlier this year, David Bennett, the new chairman of Monitor, confirmed that that was the Government’s plan, saying that Monitor’s role would be comparable with the regulators of the gas, electricity and telecoms markets.
Labour Members have consistently argued that such a model is entirely wrong for our NHS. People’s need for health care is not the same as their need for gas, water or telecoms. There is a fundamental difference between needs, ability to benefit, the complexity of services and the fact that they are far more interlinked. The NHS is not a normal market. It is not like a supermarket, or like gas or the railways. There are much more important issues at stake.
…The Bill will guarantee that the NHS will be treated as a full market, and the providers of services will, for the first time, be treated as undertakings for the purpose of competition law. The Secretary of State said that the Bill would not increase the applicability of competition law, but the Minister of State confirmed it when he told the Committee:
“UK and EU competition laws will increasingly become applicable…in a future where the majority of providers are likely to be classed as undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law, that law…will apply.”––[Official Report, Health and Social Care Public Bill Committee, 15 March 2011; c. 718.]
Andrew George (Labour) talked about some of the amendments he had proposed:
That said, the purpose of my amendments…is primarily to ensure that Monitor’s role to ensure that anti-competitive behaviour is kept in its box is balanced by looking at the impact of competitive behaviour that might undermine the ability of NHS services to collaborate. The underlying purpose of amendments 1207 and 1208 is to neutralise or balance the new duty on Monitor to prevent anti-competitive practices that are against the interests of the people who use the services—in other words, patients—by also applying a duty to prevent anti-collaborative practices that would have the same effect.
…we need to ensure that we sustain the essential services. …certain services clearly need to integrate. An example is acute emergency trauma centres. If the orthopaedic, paediatric or ophthalmology services were removed from such essential centres, their ability to deal with a wide range of emergencies would be fundamentally undermined. They serve populations of between 250,000 and 500,000 people—sometimes more—and they are absolutely essential. We must ensure that we do not end up with a regulator that allows them to be undermined by imposing a duty on them not to act in an anti-competitive manner.
The House then went on to discuss the private patients’ cap. Emily Thornberry (Labour) made the crucial point:
…Baroness Williams…wrote an article…in which she says:
“One thing that remains…is the decision to lift the cap on private beds in foundation hospitals. Not only could that mean that many of our finest hospitals would gradually become private, it also means that inevitably foundation hospitals would be subject to European and British competition law.”
…the argument is about whether we should have a cap or not. If the House votes tonight to lift the cap, our constituents will ask how it can be that their representative has voted for a clause that allows private patients to fill up the national health service hospital paid for by those constituents’ taxes so that they will be pushed out of it.
The Health Minister Simon Burns defended the proposed change:
The cap is arbitrary and unfair. Several NHS trusts that are not subject to the private patient income cap have private incomes well in excess of many foundation trusts. Last year, four of the top 10 private income earners were NHS trusts—that is, without a cap. A few FTs have high private incomes simply because they did a few years ago. The cap locks FTs into keeping private income below 2002-03 levels and means that last year about 75% of FTs were severely restricted by caps of 1.5% or less. Meanwhile, patients at the Royal Marsden benefit from its cap being 31%, and it has consistently been rated as higher performing by the Care Quality Commission [part of the reason for this is that the RM does a lot of research and the cap allows some research and other activity].
…FTs will retain their principal legal purpose—to serve the NHS. This means that the majority of their income will continue to come from the NHS. With no shareholders, any profit they make will have to be ploughed back into the FT, and so will support that purpose of caring for NHS patients. The vast majority of FTs have little, if any, potential to increase private income, never mind the desire to do so. For them, NHS activity will remain the overwhelming majority of the work they do, if not all of their work. It is extremely unlikely that even the most entrepreneurial FTs with international reputations would seek to test the boundaries. Their commissioners, public and NHS staff governors would hold them to account in fulfilling their duties and serving their NHS patients.
Caroline Lucas made the ideological point:
I find it unacceptable that taxpayers’ money has ever been used to allow private patients to jump the queue and use NHS facilities. The history of the cap was all very interesting, but the bottom line is that it serves an important purpose, which is why it should stay. The Government argue that income from private patients is put back into the NHS and ultimately benefits the health service, but the reality is that when people become ill and need treatment, it is hard to justify asking them to wait longer because capacity in our NHS hospitals is being taken up by private patients. The bottom line is that an NHS hospital has to treat NHS patients, and I do not believe that we have adequate spare capacity sloshing about in the system to justify private queue-jumping into NHS hospitals.
…It is often argued that foundation trusts are about choice, but I would argue that such private treatment should be offered only when there is surplus provision in the system. It is one thing to talk about a choice of general goods and services, but it is enormously inefficient and massively costly to apply that kind of mentality to the health service. Now, we see the present Government trying to use the model introduced by the previous one to allow foundation trusts to do as they please, and lifting the cap on the income that can be derived from private sources.
The hundreds of constituents who are contacting me about this do not want private queue-jumping; they want NHS services paid for from taxation. The future of the NHS should be about developing whole systems, not isolated institutions, and private health care in the NHS should be phased out. The NHS needs to be about building networks across professional and institutional boundaries, not about creating new barriers. It needs to be about IT and information sharing, not reducing connectivity, and about getting more people treated in the community and in primary care.
Chris Leslie made an important follow-up clarification:
Long waiting lists matter because they are also the lifeblood of the private medical industry. We need only look at the advertising slogans of many private medical insurers to see how people with promises of “speedy service” and “getting your health situation sorted out quickly”. This, however, can happen in the context of NHS hospitals.
What we must do is ensure that we put the needs of NHS patients first. My worry about removing the private patient cap is that it changes the incentives relating to how the foundation trusts will work, putting revenue generation ahead of patient treatment. The allure of revenue will, of course, be there, but keeping waiting lists high is, in a sense, part of ensuring that revenue continues to come in. I want to see trusts focused absolutely and completely on reducing waiting times.